diffusion of innovations to the laws of migration, and specifically to Lee's assertion that "unless severe checks are imposed, both volume and rate of migration tend to increase with time."6 The results are set within the same sort of temporal structure that has been developed for the demographic transition, and in accordance with the geographic axiom, coherent spatial entities are identified.7 The principle of least effort, though not specifically invoked, is imbedded in much that follows. The hypothesis set forth here is original only to the degree that it makes visible the implicit and joins together a number of ideas already immanent in the literature.8 The exposition is almost entirely at the descriptive level; no serious effort is made to plumb the processual depths.
In this reconnaissance voyage the route is both deductive and inductive. The proposed generalizations seem logical in the light of current geographic and demographic doctrine. They also survive testing with what fragmentary evidence is readily accessible, but a more searching examination of a greater range of data is clearly in order.
THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE MOBILITY TRANSITION
The hypothesis of the mobility transition can be expressed most succinctly as follows: There are definite, patterned regularities in the growth of 6 Lee, op. cit. [see footnote 3 above], p. 53. 7 The theme of successively more advanced forms of a phenomenon-biological, social, or cultural -moving outward from a generative center and thus creating concentric zones has been developed in the biological and anthropological literature (in essence, the age-area concept), but its only vocal champion among geographers was the late Griffith Taylor. Although he treated the notion vigorously and at some length, most fully perhaps in "Our Evolving Civilization" (Toronto, 1946), he was able to win few, if any, converts. The progress of a community toward advanced developmental status can be gauged by its control over energy, things, and knowledge, as exercised both individually and collectively, and also by the attainment of personal mobility, that is, a widening range of options for locating and patterning one's life. Obviously, these two attributes are closely related. The two transitional sequences-the demographic and the mobility transitions, plus others yet to be specified-essentially chronicle the trajectory from low to high values. Growth in power can be quite literally construed as mastery 222 THE MOBILITY TRANSITION and discharge of great quantities of chemical, kinetic, and nuclear energy. Even more basic is the power to control or to affect strongly the physical and biotic habitat, including human physiology, and to manipulate various social systems through scientific knowledge, an ever more complex technology, and an elaborate network of organizations. Of immediate concern is the fact that through biological knowledge and increasingly effective policing of the environment, modern man has extended control over his own physiology, first in the form of death control and more recently by means of birth control. The resultant series of changes is more accurately termed the "vital transition" than the "demographic transition," since the concept is only concerned with births and deaths, without taking into account other population events and characteristics.
The accretion and manipulation of human power during recent times have attracted much scholarly attention, but the remarkable expansion of personal mobility has been largely overlooked, despite its rich potential for interpreting the larger phenomenon of modernization. The volume of work on migration is considerable,9 but it is greatly overshadowed by analyses of fertility and other such popular topics. The essential reasons are to be found in the intrinsic nature of the phenomenon, in definitional problems, and in the difficulties of data procurement and analysis. Given an effective registration system, we can count births and deaths with the greatest of ease. But exactly who is a migrant, and what do we mean by migration? No general consensus is likely for some time, since we are confronted here by a physicalsocial transaction, not just an unequivocal biological event. Several subsidiary questions must be answered, for example: How far (or how rapidly) need one travel and for how long to be classed as a migrant? What are the purposes of the trip? How different are origin and destination? How do we handle repetitive trips? But the most profound difficulty is the intimate, yet ambiguous, liaison between territorial and social mobility. Clearly one is partly, Genuine migration obviously means a perceptible and simultaneous shift in both spatial and social locus, so that the student cannot realistically measure one kind of movement while he ignores the other. Which family is more migratory, the one transferred 3000 miles across the continent by an employer to be plugged into a suburb almost duplicating its former neighborhood, or the black family that moves a city block into a previously white district? Ideally, we should observe shifts in both varieties of space in tandem, but given the dearth of techniques and data for handling purely social movement, we are forced to rely almost solely on territorial movements as a clumsy surrogate for total mobility. When a truly serviceable index of mobility is fabricated, it will certainly be composite, bringing together measures of several dimensions. The problem is comparable to that of gauging general socioeconomic advancement: no single number will do; a variety of indicators must be viewed simultaneously.,o Thus when we speak of changes in mobility in this essay, only rough orders of magnitude can be suggested.
THE RECENT HISTORIC TRANSFORMATION
The growth in individual mobility has been spectacular in modernizing societies. If we use sedentary peasant societies as our datum plane, the life patterns of all but a few privileged or exceptional persons are, or were, preordained by circumstances of birth. Options of activities were rigidly constrained by gender and by inherited class, caste, occupation, religion, and location. Barring disaster, the orbit of physical movement was severely circumscribed, and the feasible range of information and ideas was narrow and stagnant, changing almost imperceptibly from generation to generation.
Today, by contrast, many individuals in the most advanced societies, and But perhaps the greatest of the new mobilities is that of the mind. Perception and thought are no longer tethered to the living memory and to the here and now but have been stretched to virtual infinity. Through such instrumentalities as the printing press, camera, telephone, postal system, radio, television, phonograph, electronic computer, library, museum, school, theater, and concert hall, as well as personal gadding about, there remain no effective boundaries beyond which the nimbler mind cannot penetrate. This intellectual mobility is not just outward to all parts of the earth and the observable universe or backward and forward through time but is into other dimensions as well-the psychological, the esthetic, and the scientific. All these forms of motion are closely interrelated: increasing freedom of spatial movement is both cause and effect of other forms of enhanced mobility. On still another level, it is also true that the two dynamic processes, magnification of power and of mobility, though distinct at their cores, are also vigorously interactional, one feeding heartily on the other. This newly won freedom of movement in a multidimensional physicalsocial-psychic space has not been achieved without paying a penalty. Greater mobility means shallower local attachment, and some would argue that rootlessness may be psychologically detrimental. There has been an erosion of kinship and place-dependent social ties; the individual's perception of, and feeling for, his immediate habitat, his whole sense of place, inay be disintegrating. This matter is subsidiary to the larger issues of modernization. For all its vast momentum and seeming inevitability, no convincing proof exists that modernization has meant any real gain in the more inward, and presumably genuine, measures of welfare at the individual or social scale.
TERRITORIAL MOBILITY
The concept of territorial mobility-used here as a substitute for the totality of social and physical mobility-calls for close examination. The term "territorial mobility" is comprehensive, combining conventional (that is, residential) migration with what, for lack of a better designation, can be called "circulation." As generally defined, migration is any permanent or semipermanent change of residence; more meaningfully, perhaps, it is a spatial transfer from one social unit or neighborhood to another, which The most difficult problem in defining mobility has been left for last. 
226
THE MOBILITY TRANSITION we perceive and evaluate time and people any more immutable than distance is? Can we confidently say that an hour is equivalent to an hour, or one infant to one infant, when one society is being compared with another, or when we look at the same community at different dates? We may be boxed in by the spurious precision of numbers.
The number of potential demographic transitions has not been exhausted by the addition of a mobility transition to the vital (mistakenly known as the demographic) transition. The relatively early discovery of the vital transition mnay have been the natural consequence of its sharp impact on three of the most visible and significant of all statistical indexes, namely, total population, crude birth rate, and crude death rate. An occupational transition, frequently implied in the literature but never fully spelled out, would comprise that series of changes whereby the industrial-occupational structure ofpremodern societies evolves from heavy concentration in the primary sector to an almost totally different modem mix, the upward shift into secondary, tertiary, and eventually quaternary occupations. Similarly, the literature is strewn with hints of an educational transition. The series of steps from a totally illiterate society to one in which most young adults attend college could be delineated and its relationships to other channels of socioeconomic development explored.
Much could also be gained by charting the progression in forms of inorbidity and cause of death from the relatively primitive community to the highly advanced, or the changes in marital and family characteristics. It would fall largely to settlement and urban geographers, who already command much documentary evidence, to outline the residential transition, which might unite census-derived data with details of physical morphology and could also subsume the rank-size rule as one of the terminal conditions.'s All such transitional sequences seem susceptible to treatment as diffusional phenomena, spreading upward and outward through space-time. Indeed, it seems strange to find so few serious attempts to treat the historical geography of modern urbanization in a diffusional framework by charting the spatial extension of cities and metropolitan areas at the national scale or beyond.I6 opportunities. Friedlander's evidence is persuasive, and it would seem worthwhile to examine other ways in which population dynamics, fertility level, and migration rates may be interconnected and to do so in an explicitly spatial manner.'9
As in all geographical discourse, the question of scale is crucial. The mobility transition is intended as a highly idealized, flexible scheme that affords a general overview of a variety of places and periods. It is aloof from "accidents" or exceptional circumstances; it is of little help in describing or predicting specific patterns of migration or circulation for a particular small area or set of areas over a brief period; it is deliberately vague in indicated distances, elapsed time, and rates. But if geography and history are viewed in extremely soft focus through the lens of the hypothesis, it may have value in whatever broader insights are forthcoming.
THE CHANGING FORMS OF TERRITORXIL MOBILITY
The temporal sequence of a five-stage mobility transition is set forth here in outline form (Table I) (1) The decline in fertility has terminated, and a socially controlled fertility oscillates rather unpredictably at low to moderate levels (2) Mortality is stabilized at levels near or slightly below fertility with little year-to-year variability (3) There is either a slight to moderate rate of natural increase or none at all Table I would appear to vary considerably through time in their relative volumes and rates. Comparative time profiles for these rates are sketched in Figure 2 . The progression of five phases of spatial mobility is indicated for an ideal nation (one that averages out the demographic history of the whole universe of currently advanced countries), in which the potential migrant enjoys a full range of options. In addition, the magnitude of movement that might have occurred but was obviated by the recent availability of superior transport and communications is hypothesized in Figures 2F and C . In all cases the vertical scale is nonnumerical, since only the roughest order of magnitude can be indicated. It is also meant to show total movement-that is, the algebraic sum of inward and outward shifts-rather than just net values. The first three curves (Figs. 2A, B, and C) 
PHASE I OF THE MOBILITY TRANSITION
The mobilirt transition begins with the set of conditions characteristic of medieval Europe or Japan and of much of the contemporary underdeveloped world. The migratory practices of hunting-and-gathering folk or cultivators at the tribal level have been so diverse that generalization seems futile. Moreover, it is unnecessary, since without exception genuine progress toward modernization has been initiated only by fairly dense populations of sedentary farmers, among whom a few small cities may be interspersed, or by emigrants from such nuclear developmental zones. During Phase I genuine migration--that is, movement across appreciable physical and social intervals -was an uncommon occurrence. Any detachment from one social unit to join another with which no regular intercourse took place was usually of a marital or martial nature. Some circulation might occur, but normally within a well-trodden social space-for example, the daily journey to field, pasture, fishery, or quarry, trips to fairs, shrines, and courts, or the rather more extended sojourns of apprentices and students.22 The only persons freely to cross major social boundaries would be aristocrats, religious pilgrims and scholars, merchants, warriors, criminals, sailors, and so on, some of whom might elect to become full-fledged migrants or expatriates. Essentially, then, the universe of premodern, traditional communities was one of an array of cells firmly fixed in space with rather strong, if invisible, membranes surrounding each unit. Given the sturdiness of social ties, low levels of transport and communication technology, the sharply circumscribed mental horizons, and the minimal disposable incomes of most persons, it is scarcely surprising to find little beyond the most localized territorial mobility.
Evidence for the foregoing statements is patchy and imperfect, but it does have cumulative weight. Recently, selected parish and various government records for medieval and early-modern England, France, the Netherlands, and other European lands have been analyzed with diligence and ingenuity to determine the demographic structure and dynamics of these countries. Al- Ceylon failed to show more than an insignificant amount of internal migration.28 It is noteworthy that in these countries, and probably in many other underdeveloped lands, a rapid, massive buildup in rural numbers occurred well before any major surge in mobility rates. The slack in the traditional rural economy may have been sufficient to permit substantial growth in the labor force before saturation caused a spilling outward of the unemployable. In effect, then, the later part of Phase I of the mobility transition overlaps the opening episodes of Phase B of the vital transition.
TEMPORAL TRENDS AND SPATIAL PATTERNS DURING PHASE II
The onset of modernization (or more precisely the onset of major change in the reproductive budget in Phase B, along with a general rise in material welfare or expectations and improvements in transport and communications) brings with it a great shaking loose of migrants from the countryside. This traumatic social event first occurred in Great Britain and appeared shortly thereafter in mainland northwestern Europe. Rapid growth in rural population, changes in agricultural landholding and production systems, and a perceived lack of local economic opportunity impelled mounting numbers of individuals to confront a series of choices. If the farmer and his fanily had neither inclination nor opportunity to desert the rural locality, they had no alternative but to adopt a more labor (or capital) intensive mode of production that yielded more food and perhaps more cash per unit area, thus continuing the evolutionary sequence of land uses postulated by Boserup.29 The ternminal stage of this trend would be the extremely intensive exploitation of land by largely traditional methods that Geertz has termed "agricultural involution," so beautifully exemplified in Java.30 A less common strategy would be to combine part-time employment on the farm with work in town, a form of commutation that may precede later migration.
But the most effective solution in rural societies passing through Phase II seems to be out-migration. Peasants use another water-control method at transplanting and may even use it for seedbeds in the clayier soils between the Kelantan and Golok Rivers. Because the season of westerly winds is never really rainless, during it they can expect sporadic convectional storms. After one shower from "the Westerlies" the peasants plow their ground at least twice and then rake it until the surface is finely divided. This "puddling" seals the surface, so that the next shower cannot sink in rapidly and cannot run away because of the bunding. By this means fields are made fit for transplanting. Two or three such fields may be covered inches deep with water when the whole of a large block of padi fields surrounding them may be so dry, and the grass so parched, that it is impossible to believe any shower has recently occurred. It is a technique curiously reminiscent of the dry farming of Mediterranean countries.
When the Westerlies are unusually late, plowing for seedbeds or for transplanting may be so delayed that the peasants will do it by moonlight. Wide variations in yield from place to place are the result not only of variations in the availability of ground water but also of variations in precipitation at places not very different in aspect (Table I) Phase II of the mobility transition and Phase B of the vital transition, it must be stressed again, have behaved like world pandemics, spreading rapidly and easily almost everywhere when the first readily portable eletnents of modernization began to be broadcast around the world. The present underdeveloped regions are, in fact, in a condition of early, incomplete, and dangerously unbalanced modernization. Symptomatic of this unbalanced state is the disparity between a partly modernized mortality regime and a still largely traditional fertility regime, and between a set of strong migrational "pushes" and "pulls" that are much too weakly compensatory on either the domestic or the international scale.
From this point the discussion bifurcates into a recital of events already acted out, or still progressing, in the advanced countries and those that may come to pass in the less advanced areas. If we assume, none too realistically, that no major military or ecological disaster will occur, the sequence may be sketched diagrammatically (Fig. 3) . Obviously, the critical question is whether, why, and how a community can generate that mysterious impetus needed to spring upward along the developmental ladder to the critical rung represented by Phase III of the mobility transition or by Phase C of the vital transition. Recent history strongly indicates that achievement of Phase III automatically induces Phase IV at a later date-and, possibly, the yet un- there follow movements incident on military service, marriage, job assignments either from one employer to another or within a single corporate structure, and, finally, to place of retirement. All this is aside from brief circulatory excursions of a few days' or weeks' duration.
On the international scene, there is a comparable circulation of a mobile elite consisting of professionals, celebrities, the wealthy, and the highly skilled that involves not just citizens of advanced nations but highly educated or privileged persons of less developed lands.53 It would be edifying to plot the domiciles, transient or extended, of mining engineers, orchestra conductors, geographers, cinematic directors and actors, missionaries, athletes,54 and certain types of business executives.55 Although the data are deplorably defective, it seems safe to assume that aggregate circulatory movement for most people living in Phase IV areas has reached unprecedented levels. More persons are making longer trips for a greater variety of reasons more often than ever before, and some of these result in full-fledged migrational transfers. In the United States one imperfect 
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THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW psychologically and physiologically? The psychological question has already been raised concerning present transoceanicjet travel and the prospective SST. When and how will mobility saturation be reached? In any event, further general socioeconomic advance may well bring in its wake socially imposed mechanisms for controlling location and movement of populations. What might be technically and politically feasible is unclear, but planning for a restructured urban system and for circulation and migration therein may become urgent in the near future. The traffic-control systems on our streets may be a primitive precursor of much more elaborate devices.
To return to the model, earlier trends may be duplicated in the emergence of Phase V regions; that is to say, a mobility regime in which the vigorous interchange of migrants among urban places continues with another escalation of rates and unpredictable new varieties of circulation would appear in those innovational hearths where Phases III and IV first became observable. The earliest occurrence may be in northwestern Europe, but it is even likelier in places with more frenetic socioeconomic evolution, as in urbanized Japan or the most advanced segments of Anglo-America. In fact, the nearest approach to Phase V at this moment would seem to be in Southern California. Does the proposed mobility transition imply an eventual homogenization of the entire inhabited world as a single Phase IV (or V) region? The answer, of course, hinges largely on the fate of the Phase II countries poised at the crossroads from which they must move uphill toward higher status or downward into that slough of despond, the demographic relapse. Apart from the interesting problem of whether it is technically and ecologically possible, or philosophically desirable, for the entire human species to exist at a truly lofty socioeconomic level, such an outcome would imply revision of at least one attribute of Phase 1V. With the evaporation of significant pools of unskilled labor, there would cease to be any movement of low-wage migrant labor to affluent areas unable to handle menial chores with local recruits. But by that time one can also visualize a degree of technological and social progress obviating the need for human drudges.
Because of its intrinsic nature, the mobility transition, like the vital transition, does not faithfully simulate earlier examples each time it is triggered off. Failure to appreciate its cybernetic properties or to consider the importance of temporal or spatial scale has provoked much unjustified criticism of the vital transition. Both transitions are episodes in the history of a single large demographic system interlinked with other social systems, and both bristle with feedback effects. Indeed, a truly penetrating analysis of the In summary, then, we have added to the vital transition a second sequential spatiotemporal process, the mobility transition, that is essential to the understanding of the modernization phenomenon. Both transitions identified thus far are irreversible; barring a truly major catastrophe, neither the world as a whole nor any single region can ever revert to anything resembling its pristine, premodern condition. Furthermore, they are highly time specific. They have occurred only within a fraction (less than a thousand years) of the scores of millennia Homo sapiens has already endured, and the precise date at which the transition is initiated in a particular region is profoundly significant. Both transitions seem to have a fatalistic inevitability; all human communities have been launched upon them, and if they can surmount the developmental crisis that occurs in midstream, all appear destined to rush forward to whatever terminal conditions may be implied by extremely advanced demographic development.
